Records reveal what Chrétien told ministers before Quebec referendum

By Canadian Press on October 15, 2025.

MONTREAL — Six days before the nail-biting 1995 Quebec referendum that nearly tore the country apart, Jean Chrétien told his ministers to keep their cool.

The prime minister acknowledged that day that Quebecers might vote to separate from Canada on Oct. 30. He told his cabinet it wasn’t the time to discuss the consequences of a vote for independence, but if it happened, “no one should panic or act precipitously.”

The sombre message, delivered behind closed doors, is coming to light through newly disclosed federal cabinet minutes obtained by The Canadian Press.

In the months before the vote, Chrétien had expressed confidence about the campaign. But 30 years after the referendum, the meeting minutes show how the tone of the conversations around Chrétien’s cabinet table shifted dramatically as Canada confronted a national unity crisis.

The documents, released by the federal government through access to information legislation, offer a glimpse behind the scenes during a critical moment in Canada’s history. They paint a picture of a campaign that was abruptly thrown off course, of a prime minister who urged his cabinet to stay calm, and of a last-minute scramble to keep the country together.

During that meeting just before the vote – on Oct. 24, 1995 – Chrétien told his cabinet he would, at last, be taking centre stage in the campaign. Until then, the prime minister and other federal officials had largely stayed on the margins of the campaign, which was led by the Quebec Liberal leader.

Chrétien stressed the gravity of the situation, even as he warned his ministers against becoming “overly distraught.” In the preceding days, the federalist campaign had seen its polling lead evaporate as the charismatic Lucien Bouchard galvanized support for Quebec’s separation.

According to the minutes, several ministers from outside Quebec expressed their frustration at “being on the sidelines” of a debate “that could profoundly affect the future of their country.” They said it was “crucial” for Chrétien now to get more involved and “speak from the heart.” The prime minister said he would give a televised address to the nation the following day.

Chrétien’s remarks during the Oct. 24 meeting contrast with minutes from cabinet meetings leading up to the October campaign, which show the prime minister at times wondered aloud whether a vote on independence would be held at all.

In the end, the federalists won the referendum by a razor-thin margin, with 50.58 per cent of the vote – a victory, but only just. The following day, Chrétien reminded his ministers to “have a positive attitude in public and in front of the media and to be confident in expressing the referendum outcome as a victory for Canada.”

“Had he not stepped in … I think we would have lost the country,” said then-deputy prime minister Sheila Copps in a recent interview.

The 1995 referendum campaign officially kicked off on Oct. 2, though it had unofficially begun months earlier. Then-Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau had promised to hold a referendum within a year following his 1994 election, and in early 1995 he launched a series of public consultations meant to drum up support for independence.

At the time, Chrétien’s instructions to his cabinet were to “remain calm and avoid any overreaction.” The referendum campaign was still far away, he said in January, and “there was not much which could be done now.”

In any case, the “No” campaign would be led by provincial Liberal leader Daniel Johnson – not the prime minister. Chrétien, who was not popular in Quebec, was “pretty well told to butt out,” said Copps.

That spring, things were looking grim for the separatist movement, whose leaders were fighting among themselves over the wording of the question on the referendum ballot.

Parizeau favoured a clean separation from the rest of the country, while Bouchard, then-leader of the Bloc Québécois, felt Quebecers would not vote for independence without the promise of an economic partnership with Canada.

“We had quiet confidence that the ‘Yes’ side would not prevail,” said John Rae, a longtime Chrétien adviser. “We felt that things were going pretty well.”

Cabinet records are usually kept secret, but they can be released under federal access to information legislation after 20 years. The Privy Council Office initially tried to censor portions of the records prior to releasing them under the transparency law, but it later agreed to uncensor some of those passages following an investigation by the federal information watchdog.

In March 1995, when it seemed unlikely that Parizeau would call a vote that spring, Chrétien told his cabinet he thought the sovereigntists “were afraid to hold a referendum.” He said in April it was possible a vote “would not be held at all,” citing Quebec editorials calling for “an indefinite delay.”

Despite those encouraging signs, Lucienne Robillard, the minister responsible for the federal campaign, cautioned in the spring “that the government should be careful not to appear triumphant.” And by the summer, the situation was starting to change.

In June, Parizeau had consented to sign a pact with Bouchard and Mario Dumont, the young leader of the fledgling Action démocratique du Québec, promising that the referendum question would include an offer of a new political and economic association with the rest of Canada. Chrétien described the agreement to his ministers as “a tactic to confuse Quebecers about the question and what was at stake in the referendum.”

That August, Robillard presented polling to the cabinet that showed a majority of Quebecers still planned to vote against independence, but that the prospect of a partnership with Canada significantly narrowed the gap. The key message for the federalist campaign to convey was that “the promise of an association with Canada was a false promise,” she said.

Still, Chrétien remained confident of a “No” victory, the minutes say.

The Canadian Press was unable to reach Chrétien for comment about the revelations in the minutes and Robillard declined an interview request.

The referendum question was unveiled in early September, and as promised, asked voters to decide whether Quebec should become sovereign only “after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership.”

It was a “trick question,” according to Eddie Goldenberg, Chrétien’s senior policy adviser at the time. “They were asking a question that would be unclear enough to get the type of result they wanted to get.”

By the start of the campaign in October, Robillard told cabinet there was “a great deal of confusion” about what the vote actually meant. On Oct. 3, she pointed to polling that showed 22 per cent of respondents thought Quebec would remain a province of Canada after a “Yes” victory.

Overall, though, things were still looking good for the “No” side, which maintained a 10-point lead over the separatist campaign. Chrétien cautioned his ministers against appearing “overconfident.”

Three weeks later, however, everything had changed. In a Hail Mary bid to turn things around, Parizeau on Oct. 7 made a surprise announcement that Bouchard would be “chief negotiator” for the partnership talks following a vote to separate – effectively handing him the reins of the campaign.

Bouchard, who had recently lost his leg to flesh-eating bacteria, was “seen as something of a miracle because he had narrowly escaped death,” said Louise Harel, then a Parti Québécois minister.

“Politics isn’t just cerebral,” she said. “There’s emotion involved, too. People trusted him.” In a matter of days, the “Yes” campaign was leading in the polls.

The impact of Chrétien’s last-ditch efforts is up for debate. Harel said many on the “Yes” side believed they would have won had the campaign been one week longer.

But Goldenberg said Chrétien’s eleventh-hour intervention helped to change the tenor of a “No” campaign that until then had lacked emotion. “There was no appeal to patriotism. … There was no appeal to why you would want to be a Canadian,” he said.

“And in hindsight, we made a mistake there. But you know, at the end of the day, we won.”

This report by The Canadian Press was first published Oct. 14, 2025.

Maura Forrest, The Canadian Press